The
Treaty of Moscow was signed between Soviet Russia and Kemalist Turkey
on March 16, 1921. The Russian side yielded to most Turkish demands, and
signed a document that was utterly damaging to Armenia for the sake of
Russian-Turkish “friendship and brotherhood.”
The
treaty was the outcome of the second Russian-Turkish conference, held
in Moscow from February 26-March 16, 1921, with the participation of two
Russian (Georgi Chicherin, the Commissar of Foreign Affairs, and Jelal
Korkmasov) and three Turkish representatives (Yusuf Kemal bey, Riza Nur
bey, and Ali Fuad pasha). Stalin, the Commissar of Nationalities,
lobbied against any claim from Turkey that could put the Russian-Turkish
alliance in risk. In a letter to Lenin on February 12, 1921, he had
written: “I just learned yesterday that Chicherin really sent a stupid
(and provocative) demand to the Turks to clean Van, Mush, and Bitlis
(Turkish provinces with enormous Turkish supremacy) to the benefit of
Armenians. This Armenian imperialist demand cannot be our demand.
Chicherin must be forbidden to send notes to the Turks suggested by
nationalist-oriented Armenians.” The Bolsheviks sought to halt further
Turkish advance into the region. Weary from the ongoing Russian Civil
War, which was winding down, they had no intent of starting a new war.
Not
surprisingly, Chicherin refrained from his pro-Armenian position, and
declared during the conference that Russia would not insist about
passing the border to the west of the Akhurian (Arpachay) and the south
of the Arax rivers. This meant that the entire province of Kars and the
district of Surmalu (Igdir), which had never belonged to the Ottoman
Empire, would go to Turkey. The Turkish delegation additionally claimed
for the province of Nakhichevan, which historically had belonged to the
Armenian Province and then to the governorate of Yerevan under the rule
of the Russian Empire, to be put under Azerbaijani administration.
Thus,
the treaty of “friendship and brotherhood” between Soviet Russia and
Turkey recognized Turkish control over Artvin, Ardahan, Kars, and
Surmalu. The region of Adjara, with the port of Batum, was returned to
Soviet Georgia on the condition that it would be granted political
autonomy due to its largely Muslim Georgian population. (Adjara became
an autonomous republic within Georgia.) Turkey withdrew from
Alexandropol (nowadays Gumri) and a new border was established between
Turkey and Soviet Armenia, defined by the Arax and Akhurian rivers.
According to these new boundaries, Mount Ararat and the ruins of Ani
remained within Turkey.
The
treaty also stipulated that Nakhichevan would become an autonomous
entity under Azerbaijani protectorate. Azerbaijan obliged not to
transfer the jurisdiction to a third party, namely, Armenia.
Additionally, Turkey later acquired a small strip of territory known as
the Arax corridor, which had also been part of the governorate of
Yerevan. This corridor was located east of Surmalu, limited by the Arax
River to the north and the Lower Karasu River to the south. It was a
strategic strip of land that allowed Turkey to share a common border
with Nakhichevan and, consequently, Soviet Azerbaijan.
Both
signatory parties were internationally unrecognized, and thus were not
subject of international law, which made the treaty illegal and invalid.
The RSFSR, now under the guise of the Union of Soviet Socialist
Republics, was legally recognized for the first time in 1924 by Great
Britain. The Great National Assembly of Turkey was a non-governmental
organization led by Mustafa Kemal, which did not have any legal grounds
to represent the Turkish state in international relations. According to
the Ottoman Constitution, only the sultan had the right to engage other
states, be it personally or through a representative. The Kemalist
movement was actually a rebellion against the legal authorities of the
country, and Kemal was a criminal fugitive who had been sentenced to
death by a fatwa signed by the Sheikh-ul-Islam, the highest religious
authority of the Ottoman Empire, on April 11, 1920, and a court-martial
on May 11, 1920.
The
section of the Treaty of Moscow related to Armenia was a violation of
international law, since treaties can only refer to the signatory
parties and do not create any obligation to third parties that are not
bound by treaty without the latter’s agreement. At the time of the
Treaty, the Soviet regime had been thrown out from Armenia by the
popular rebellion of February 1921.
The
treaty was reaffirmed in October 1921 with the Treaty of Kars and the
borders it established have been maintained ever since. However, this
did not mean that Soviet policymakers necessarily accepted the terms of
the treaty as permanent. After World War II, when the Soviet Union was
at the zenith of its power, its leader Stalin reopened the issue on
behalf of Armenia and his native Georgia. Supported by Moscow, both
republics began to assert territorial claims against Ankara. According
to Soviet leader Nikita Khrushchev, Stalin made this move at the
insistence of Lavrenti Beria, the deputy premier and a fellow Georgian.
Indeed, Ankara sought the support of Washington, which had become
suspicious of Soviet intentions with the onset of the Cold War. The
issue was eventually dropped by Moscow and by 1952 Turkey joined NATO,
precluding any further discussion on border revisions.
The
frontiers established by the 1921 treaty remained unaltered and were
maintained by the newly-independent states of Russia, Georgia, Armenia,
and Azerbaijan after the dissolution of the U.S.S.R.
Following
the shoot down of a Russian plane over the Syria–Turkey border in
November 2015 and the rise of Russo-Turkish tensions, members of the
Communist Party of Russia proposed the nullification of the Treaty of
Moscow. Initially, the Russian Foreign Ministry considered this action
in order to send a political message to Turkey.
However, Moscow ultimately decided against it in its effort to de-escalate tensions with Ankara.
